NOTE

Narrowing the Scope of Civil Drug Forfeiture: Section 881, Substantial Connection and the Eighth Amendment
Let this be recorded as the time when America rose up and said "no" to drugs. The scourge of drugs must be stopped, and I am asking tonight for an increase of almost a billion dollars ... to escalate the war against drugs. The war must be waged on all fronts.
-President George Bush 1 The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.
-Ex parte Milligan 2
To note that this country is engaged in a "war on drugs" borders on the cliche. In recent years, leading politicians have escalated the rhetoric and action against users and suppliers of illegal drugs. 3 The public has demanded increasingly tough enforcement, even demonstrating a willingness to infringe on civil liberties. 4 Since 1986, law enforcement agencies have stepped up seizures of cars, boats, and planes, 5 sometimes for possession of extremely small amounts of drugs. 6 As the country continues to fight the drug war, the battle can threaten to seize all of a person's property. 13 The circuits presently disagree over the scope of property subject to civil forfeiture. 14 Three circuits require a "substantial connection" between the conveyance or real property to be forfeit and the underlying crime. 15 These circuits assert that forfeiture is not justified where the connection between a conveyance or parcel of real property and the drug activity falls below a minimum threshold. Five other circuits have explicitly rejected this substantial connection test. 16 This Note offers two justifications for narrowing the scope of section 881 forfeiture.17 Part I argues that courts should apply the substantial connection test to section 881 forfeitures. This Part analyzes the statute using the traditional tools of statutory interpretation. While the text of the statute seems to support the broadest possible interpretation, the legislative history and context of adoption suggest that the substantial connection test is consistent with Congressional intent. In amending section 881, subsequent Congresses have favored application of the substantial connection test. Consistent with this narrower reading, present strategy in the "war on drugs" focuses stiff penalties on principal traffickers; individual users receive significantly [Vol. 89:165 more lenient treatment. Part II argues that eighth amendment 18 review should limit section 881 forfeiture. Section II.A argues that section 881 forfeiture, despite its civil label, functions as a criminal punishment to which constitutional protections should be applied. Section II.B argues, in the alternative, that the history of the eighth amendment and recent Supreme Court analysis justifies eighth amendment review in even purely civil cases where the government is the party seeking forfeiture. Finally, Part III engages each of the narrowing processes. First, the substantial connection cases denying forfeiture are harmonized by development of a "second-degree facilitation" test. Second, this Part identifies the seeds of eighth amendment values in the substantial connection cases. Section III.C suggests the circumstances in and the methods by which courts should apply eighth amendment review to section 881 forfeiture. Applying these eighth amendment principles will protect the rights of claimants without impeding the effort to curtail drug trafficking.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The text of section 881 seems to permit the broadest possible application of forfeiture. This Part, however, argues that the substantial connection test fully comports with the statute's text, read within principles of strict construction, and provides a better overall interpretation. The enacting Congress was primarily concerned with attacking large scale narcotics operations. Subsequent Congresses, in amending section 881, have indicated the propriety of the substantial connection test. In addition, interpreting the statute in the context of the present war on drugs suggests that an expansive reading of section 881 may be inconsistent with current values.
A. The Text of the Statute t9
Circuits rejecting the substantial connection test point directly to the text of the statute. 20 On its face, section 881 appears to require the 18. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VIII.
19. Statutory interpretation begins with the text. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981) . Even scholars who propose interpretive schemes which look beyond the statute's text or the intent of the enacting legislature or both use the text as a boundary within which the interpretation must lie. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 81 MICH. L. REv. 20, 60 (1988) ("It is crucial to see that while nautical models of statutory interpretation may be openly nonarcheologica/, they are not nontextual • • • Ultimately the question is, what is the most plausible meaning today that these words will bear."); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 REv. , 1496 REv. (1987 ("In many cases, the text of the statute will provide determinate answers . . . . In general, the more detailed the text is, the greater weight the interpreter will give to the textual considerations •.•• ").
20. United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Ill., 903 F.2d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft TC740, 691 F.2d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 1982 broadest possible scope for forfeiture. 21 Subsections 88l(a) (4) and 881(a)(7) provide for forfeiture of property used "in any manner" to facilitate the underlying drug crime. 22 Section 881 appears to have been modeled on a prior forfeiture statute covering much of the same ground. In language similar to section 881, 49 U.S.C. app. § § 781-7822 3 provide for the forfeiture of vessels, vehicles, and aircraft used in drug crimes. While " [l] anguage in one statute usually sheds little light upon the meaning of different language in another statute ... ," 24 the language in section 881 differs primarily in the inclusion of the phrase "in any manner." If section 881 was enacted with sections 781 and 782 in mind, the single phrase alteration might have substantive meaning. The circuits rejecting the substantial connection test have noted this different language in their expansive reading of section 881. 25 At first blush, their expansive reading may be necessary to avoid rendering section 881 redundant with sections 781-782.
This argument, however, assumes both explicit legislative consideration of the prior statute and a specific intended meaning for the phrase "in any manner." Neither assumption is justified. First, the legislative history of section 881 is devoid of reference to section 781. 26 In 1970, Congress was deliberating a "comprehensive" drug abuse and enforcement act. 27 The duplication of the section 781-782 enforcement provisions in section 881 could be explained by Congress' desire 21 . See supra note 8. 22. See supra note 8. As the opinion in One Parcel .
•. Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue demonstrates, courts which refuse to look beyond the "plain meaning" of the statute will be inclined against the substantial connection test. 903 F.2d at 492-96. This Part implicitly suggests that other evidence better illuminates Congressional intent. Additionally, the words of section 881 should be read as words defined by similar words in a previous drug forfeiture statute. Hence, plain meaning is inappropriate. See infra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
23. The statutes provide: "It shall be unlawful ... to use any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft to facilitate the transportation, carriage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter, exchange, or giving away of any contraband article." 49 U.S.C. app. § 78l(a)(3) (1982) . "Any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft which has been or is being used in violation of any provision of section 781 of this Appendix, or in, upon, or by means of which any violation of said section has taken or is taking place, shall be seized and forfeited .... " 49 U.S.C. app . § 782 (1982) . 49 U.S.C. § § 781-782 were enacted in 1939. Act of Aug. 9, 1939 , Pub. L. No. 76-357, 53 Stat. 1291 , 1291 24. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 25 (1984) . But see Communication Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988) (nearly identical language of Railway Labor Act section and National Labor Relations Act section compelled identical interpretation despite general rule against reading the statutes together).
25. See, e.g., United States v. One 1979 Mercury Cougar XR-7, 666 F.2d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 1982 ; United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423-25 (2d Cir. 1977 33603-67, 35050, 35051-58, 35477-90, 35494-96, 35516-23, 35549-59 (1970) .
27. The House Committee wrote, This legislation is designed to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States (1) through providing authority for increased efforts in drug abuse prevention and rehabilitation of users, (2) through providing more effective [Vol. 89:165 to include all programs and penalties in a single bill. Had sections 781 and 782 been at the forefront of Congress' consideration, those statutes would likely have been amended, or, at least, would have been discussed in the legislative history. In fact, section 881 seems to have commanded little of the enacting Congress' attention; the main debates occurred over the theory of punishment to be followed 28 and the desirability and constitutionality of "no-knock" warrants. 2 9 Second, if Congress did desire section 881 to broaden the scope of property subject to forfeiture, this conclusion does not require rejection of the substantial connection test. Courts had construed sections 781-782 extremely narrowly. In general, these cases rejected forfeiture of vehicles which had clearly facilitated a drug transaction, but had not been part of the actual drug crime. In the typical case, the courts refused to order forfeiture of vehicles which had provided transportation to negotiations and did not transport the drugs after the sale. 30 Congress, therefore, may have been pointing at transportation to or from the scene of the negotiations or crime by inclusion of the phrase "in any manner." This conclusion does not invalidate the substantial connection test. The Eighth Circuit, which has adopted the substantial connection test, has also held that section 881 supports forfeiture of vehicles used to transport traffickers to preliminary negotiations. 31 Other circuits have avoided the issue by holding that, even under the substantial connection standard, a vehicle used solely for transportation would be subject to forfeiture. 32 In fact, the Fifth Circuit has characterized the forfeitability of conveyances used for negotiations as the primary difference between section 881 and sections 781 and 782. 33 The substantial connection test invalidates forfeiture only in circumstances where the conveyance or real property is even less connected than transportation to negotiations. 34 means for law enforcement aspects of drug abuse prevention and control, and (3) by providing for an overall balanced scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving drugs.
1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 2, reprinted at 4567. See also id. at 5, reprinted at 4571 (Many pieces of legislation enacted at various times have "necessarily given rise to a confusing and often duplicative approach .
• . • This bill collects and conforms these diverse laws in one piece of legislation •... ").
28. 1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 9-12, reprinted at 4575-79 (noting the debate over retributive and rehabilitative punishment schemes); see also 116 CoNG. REc. 35,477-83 (1970) .
29. See, e.g., 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 86-89, reprinted at 4653-57; 116 CONG. REc. 35,523-40, 33,603-67 (1970) . See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 423 F.2d 1102 , 1103 (9th Cir. 1970 Although the plain language of section 881 might seem to reject the substantial connection test, reading the phrase "in any manner" against the narrow scope of sections 781-782, indicates that Congress' desire to expand forfeiture may have stopped short of such a broad command. To choose between these interpretations, the context of adoption, the explicit statements of the enacting Congress, and other extrinsic sources of legislative history must be surveyed.
30.
B. Rules of Strict Construction
When confronted with ambiguous statutes, courts often resort to rules of construction to guide interpretation. While these canons are capable of manipulation, each stands for a substantive proposition the courts seek to uphold. In evaluating section 881, two canons may aid interpretation. First, since the coercive power of the state is implicated, criminal statutes should be construed narrowly. 35 Second, courts should favor readings which avoid potential constitutional conflicts. Because forfeiture is a penalty imposed on participants in illegal drug activities, and its application to legitimately acquired conveyances and real property implicates eighth amendment protections, 36 section 881 ought to be narrowly construed.
In general, criminal statutes are strictly construed in favor of the defendant. 37 The Supreme Court has defended this rule of construction based on principles of fair notice to potential defendants and prevention of police abuse. 38 Early forfeiture cases explicitly adopted this standard. In 1875, in Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank v. Dearing, 39 the Supreme Court wrote: "Forfeitures are not favored in the law. Courts always incline against them. When either of two constructions can be given to a statute, and one of them involves a forfeiture, the other is to be preferred." 40 Similarly, in a Prohibition-era case, the Supreme Court reiterated that "[f]orfeitures are not favored; they should be enforced only when within both the letter and spirit of the law." 41 Circuit courts also have applied generally the rule of strict construction both in interpreting forfeiture statutes 42 See, e.g., United States v. McKeithen, 822 F.2d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1987 ) (applying the rule [Vol. 89:165 ing whether the property in a specific case should be forfeit under the accepted interpretation. 43 Since the text of section 881 can be read to support both the substantial connection test and a more expansive reading, the narrow construction should be preferred. Still, Supreme Court pronouncements regarding interpretation of forfeiture statutes have not been uniform. In the cases advocating broader interpretation, however, the Court was faced with statutes which mandated only the forfeiture of per se illegal goods. 44 In United States v. Stowell, 45 the Court interpreted the forfeiture statute in question, arguing that "statutes to prevent frauds upon the revenue are considered as enacted for the public good and to suppress a public wrong .... " 46 Although the forfeiture constituted a penalty, the statute ought "not to be construed, like penal laws generally, strictly in favor of the defendant; but they are to be fairly and reasonably construed, so as to cairy out the intention of the legislature." 47 The forfeiture of goods on which tax has not been paid more clearly represents a purely remedial action. The statute implies that no property rights arise until the importation tax is paid. By contrast, section 881, in many cases, extinguishes the claimant's property right in legitimately acquired property. While section 881 certainly was enacted "for the public good and to suppress a public wrong," all criminal of strict construction to criminal forfeiture under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982) Cir. 1978) .
44. This distinction will recur in this Note. The difference between a statute which confiscates goods in which the claimant never had a property right (e.g., the marijuana itself) and a statute which extinguishes a legitimately acquired property right characterizes the forfeiture as a civil or criminal penalty and as either remedial or punitive. Cf. Darmstadter 379, 475-80 (1976) . Clark looks to the purposes for which the property was acquired and the persons from whom it was acquired, instead of focusing on the means by which property rights, if any, were acquired. statutes fall within this rubric. The exception would swallow the rule; the policies of notice and restraint of the police power would be lost. Additionally, section 881 does not function as a typical civil penalty, the severity of which is determined by the damages caused by each violation. 48 The Supreme Court recently applied a broad interpretation rule to RICO forfeiture. 49 The Court, however, relied in part on the explicit congressional command of liberal interpretation.so RICO forfeiture, moreover, only reaches tainted parts of the enterprise. si Legitimately acquired property or businesses are not forfeited.
A second canon of statutory construction, avoiding constitutional issues, also supports a narrow interpretation of section 881. "Assuming that the legislature is loathe to come close to enacting unconstitutional criminal statutes, courts will construe criminal penalties narrowly enough so that there is no question of the statute's constitutionality .... "s 2 While this canon has been the subject of criticism,s 3 it should be applied to interpreting section 881. Judicial action in this area is justified by the very real need for constitutional protections. s 4 Canons of interpretation are best applied when two plausible interpretations of the statute are supportable by the text and its legislative history.ss Here, however, the text of section 881 points toward a broad interpretation while the legislative history favors the narrower, substantial connection interpretation. Nonetheless, as the division in the circuits demonstrates, both interpretations are plausible readings of section 881. The rule of narrowly construing penal statutes and the presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional provide principled bases for selecting between the competing readings. In this situation, these canons strongly suggest that the narrower substantial connection test should apply in section 881 cases.
C. The Context of Adoption
In attempting to determine the meaning or purpose sought by the 59 The solution it adopted, however, does not evidence a purely punitive approach, an approach which would justify reading the forfeiture provision as broadly as possible. The attack mounted by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Education Act of 1970 60 contained three main programs: (1) education; (2) rehabilitation; and (3) enforcement. Even in the enforcement arena, the statute focused on rehabilitation, rather than purely punitive measures. 61 Fines and penalties were decreased in some areas. 62 Additionally, section 881 contained three exceptions to mandatory forfeiture. First, conveyances owned by common carriers could not be forfeit so long as the carrier had no knowledge of illegal use. 63 Second, the property of innocent owners was not subject to forfeiture. 64 Third, the statute incorporated provisions for administrative remission and mitigation. 65 The legislation's overall plan indicates Congress directed the most severe measures at large scale drug traffickers. 66 The evidence suggests the enacting Congress intended forfeiture to apply to large scale drug traffickers and their operations. The legislation focused on depriving criminals of the profits of their trade -an attack on persons who make a living from drug trafficking. The exceptions, for common carriers and innocent third parties, demonstrate concern that those unwittingly involved in drug transactions not have their property confiscated. The cases typically addressed by the substantial connection test, of apparently minimal involvement in drug trafficking or the extinguishment of legitimately acquired property rights, fall between these two extremes. The total scheme of the 1970 Act, however, in adopting rehabilitative and lenient measures, may indicate that Congress would have been reluctant to forfeit property of all persons connected with any drug crime. 67
D. Explicit Statements of the Enacting Congress 68
The committee reports accompanying section 881 indicate no clear intent for the scope of forfeiture. The House Report, for example, does not discuss the forfeiture provision other than to provide a brief summary of the statute. 6 9 In fact, the report does not even recite the purpose of the forfeiture provisions. The little evidence in the report, however, suggests a narrow scope for section 881. Discussing the forfeiture provision, the committee wrote, Subsection (a) of this section sets forth the conditions for forfeiture and the property to be forfeited. These include all controlled substances produced or obtained in violation of the act, all raw materials, products, and equipment used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, handling, or 67. Examination of § 881 as it presently reads might indicate that § 88l(a) (4) [ Vol. 89:165 conveying controlled substances in violation of the act and any container for property previously described. Also subject to forfeiture are all conveyances used, or intended for use, to transport or conceal such violative property. 70 Under this interpretation, the conveyance could only be forfeit when used or intended for use in transporting or storing the illegal drugs. For example, an automobile which drug dealers used for transportation to negotiations would not be forfeitable. Similarly, property on which a drug transaction actually occurred would not be forfeitable, so long as the property did not "conceal" the drugs. This reading is actually narrower than the substantial connection test. 71 Combined with the evidence of a multi-level attack by the enacting Congress, 72 this language indicates a narrow interpretation would comport more closely with Congress' intent.
E. Subsequent Consideration of the Statute
Legislative reexamination of the statute may also provide clues for interpretation. 73 Later congressional consideration of section 881 further bolsters the case for narrowing its reach. Data from subsequent Congresses generally include amendments and repeals introduced and never passed, hearings held and action subsequently taken, reports on the effectiveness of a statute, and floor debate in response to court decisions. 74 At the least, pronouncements by succeeding Congresses regarding the meaning of a statute may deserve weight out of respect for Congress' democratic nature. 75 The 80 The original drug statute embodied an attempt to confront a public problem; subsequent interpretations of the statute by the legislature were no less likely addressed to the same problems. 81 The congressional statements in evidence here are taken from the history of legislation evaluating and amending section 881. 82 Section 881 has been amended substantively three times since the enactment of the conveyance forfeiture provision. Congressional statements made during consideration of two of these amendments provide strong evidence that the substantial connection test should be employed in applying section 881. In the first reconsideration, in 1978, Congress added an asset forfeiture provision. 83 Commenting on the asset forfeiture amendment, the joint committee report contained the following language, which many of the courts requiring a substantial connection have quoted with approval: 84 Due to the penal nature of forfeiture statutes, it is the intent of these gress have 'very little, if any, significance.' ") (quoting Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 593 (1958)); R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 279 (giving weight to post enactment statements will upset the original "deal" that produced the legislation).
78. See, e.g., Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) ("[W] hile the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one, such views are entitled to significant weight, and particularly so when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure.'') (citations omit_ted).
79. Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805)).
80. Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 53, at 279 ("I do not want to anathematize completely the use of postenactment materials to interpret a statute, because such materials may in some cases reflect a disinterested and informed view by a committee that is monitoring the administration of a statute; the problem is to identify those cases.'').
81. Given the increasing attention accorded to illegal drugs, subsequent Congresses probably were, if anything, predisposed toward broader interpretations.
82. In other words, the statements do not constitute the mere opinion oflegislators seeking to influence courts or the public when they have not been able to prevail in Congress. See supra note 68. Additionally, the context moves these subsequent statements closer to the model of subsequent legislation, which the Court has more consistently given "great weight.' ' See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S 367, 379 n.17 (1984) (pointing at subsequent legislation, more than subsequent statements, as deserving "great weight" provisions that property would be forfeited only if there is a substantial connection between the property and the underlying criminal activity which the statute seeks to prevent .... Similarly, any moneys, negotiable instruments, or securities that were used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of the Controlled Substances Act would be forf eitable only if they had some substantial connection to, or were instrumental in, the commission of the underlying criminal activity which the statute seeks to prevent. 8 5 This statement strongly suggests the substantial connection test best reflects Congress' intent. Courts refusing to follow this history note the lack of similar history for the conveyance forfeiture provision. In United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, TC-740, 86 the Fifth Circuit wrote that section 88l(a)(6)'s "legislative history makes no mention of using the same test for other forfeiture actions and the legislative history of § 881 [(a) (4) and (a) (7)] is devoid of any mention of a 'substantial connection' test. " 87 The Fifth Circuit might have added that the text of section 88l(a)(6) does not include the phrase "in any manner." 88 This distinction gives strong textual support to a refusal to read the substantial connection test into the conveyance and real property forfeiture provisions. This argument, while strong, does not provide sufficient ground for rejecting the substantial connection test. First, the committee report does not seem to be discussing the amendment exclusively. The first sentence, referring to substantial connection, addresses the entire forfeiture statute. The committee's statement that "similarly" the new provision allows forfeiture of moneys only if it bears a substantial connection indicates the prior reference is to section 88l(a)(4), the conveyance forfeiture provision. The committee report seems to be first explaining that section (a)(4) only applies when a substantial connection is found and, second, stating that the same standard will apply to the proposed section (a)(6). As corroboration, the same joint explanatory statement elsewhere described the existing forfeiture statute narrowly.
The types of property covered under the current law includes illicit abusable drugs, raw materials and equipment used in manufacturing such drugs, property used to contain or conceal such drugs, vehicles used to facilitate the transportation of such drugs, and any records, 625 F.2d 1026 625 F.2d , 1029 625 F.2d (1st Cir. 1980 This statement, while general, mirrors the interpretation given the statute by the enacting Congress 90 and requires that the conveyance or real property actually be used in the transportation or concealment of the illegal drugs. These two statements, in combination, demonstrate that the amending Congress believed the substantial connection test should apply to forfeitures of conveyances. Second, the purpose of section 881; attacking drug trafficking's profits and instrumentalities, contradicts the Fifth Circuit's distinction between asset forfeiture and conveyance forfeiture. As early as 1950, the Congress recognized the need to focus on the profits and instrumentalities of the drug suppliers.
Enforcement officers of the Government have found that one of the best ways to strike at commercialized crime is through the pocketbooks of the criminals who engage in it. Vessels, vehicles, and aircraft may be termed the operating tools of dope peddlers, and often represent major capital investments to criminals whose liquid assets, if any, are frequently not accessible to the Government. Seizure and forfeiture of these means of transportation provide an effective brake on the traffic in narcotic drugs. 91 Given this concern, especially with seizing liquid assets, Congress would not have enacted a stricter standard for forfeiture of cash than for conveyances. 92 Both the explicit language of the amending committee's report and the purpose of section 881 forfeiture establish that the amending Congress believed the substantial connection test should apply.
The enactment of the real property forfeiture provision, as part of 92. That conveyances and property can be traced and seized more easily than cash does not justify seizing them as surrogates. First, the inability to identify specific illegally generated proceeds casts doubt on the existence of criminal activity. Second, since the conveyance or real property often is acquired legitimately, greater protections, not lesser, are necessary in those cases.
The distinction drawn supra note 44, between property that may never be legitimately owned and property legitimately acquired but forfeit by virtue of illegal use, can be expanded. Section 881(a)(6) applies to assets that both are to be furnished for and are derived from illegal narcotics transactions. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(6) (1988) . Money acquired by sale of narcotics, which may never be owned legally, clearly is forfeitable. When money acquired legitimately is forfeit because it was intended to purchase narcotics, the courts should view this as an extinguishment of the legitimate property right and should use special care. Separating these seemingly similar transactions for different treatment actually requires the government to establish the same proof in each case. In order to show that money is derived from a drug transaction, a transaction must be shown. In other words, the government must establish illegal activity. Where no transaction has occurred, the government should be held to the higher burden of showing its contemplation. [Vol. 89:165 the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, 93 occasioned the second important reexamination of the conveyance forfeiture provision. This legislation was prompted in large part by the 1981 publication of a General Accounting Office Report criticizing the nonuse of forfeiture statutes. 94 In its hearings and reports, the amending committee identified as the existing statutes' primary failings the limited scope of RICO forfeiture and the inability to reach real property under the civil forfeiture provisions. 95 Notably absent from discussion was the "substantial connection" test.96 The committee report summarized section 881's perceived failings: · F. A Dynamic Interpretation of Section 8811°1 Careful reflection on current public sentiment does not support the extremely broad reading of section 881 that courts rejecting the substantial connection test adopt. Drug trafficking and abuse are significant current problems. This section does not attempt to refute that fact. Rather, this section attempts to demonstrate that the evidence does not all point in the same direction. Current policies and attitudes do draw distinctions between types of drug offenses and offenders. Presently, section 881 doctrine makes no distinctions between classes of offenders. 102 The substantial connection test is one method for establishing different levels of culpability . 10 3 Americans label drug abuse the number one problem in recent polls. 104 This may in part reflect public response to the increased attention given the issue by the Bush administration. 105 Objective data indicate drug use declined in the past decade. 106 Standing in sharp contrast to President Reagan's highly promoted "zero tolerance" program which cracked down on users, 107 police officials have argued these strict enforcement programs are not effective. 108 In fact, follow-101. Several legal commentators have advocated adoption of a more "dynamic" process of interpreting statutes. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Aleinikoff, supra note 19; Eskridge, supra note 19. These models look to current needs and public opinion to determine an appropriate interpretation of the statute. R. DWORKIN, supra, at 341, 349; Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1483. Statutes, at least in situations where the text and legislative history will support alternate readings, should be read against the current "web of beliefs" to identify an interpretation meeting current needs. See also Aleinikoff, supra note 19, at 49 ("[T]reat the statute as if it had been enacted yesterday and try to make sense of it in today's world.").
Eskridge limits the scope of his dynamic interpretation to public regarding statutes; the drug enforcement statutes, however, are not passed to service narrow interest groups. Aug. 23, 1988, at 3, col. 3 ("Seventy-three percent of state and local prosecutors queried singled out the Reagan administration's policy of 'zero tolerance' as having little importance as an enforcement tool."). [Vol. 89:165 ing a public outcry resulting from the seizure of many pleasure boats after finding only small amounts of drugs, the government moved away from zero tolerance. 109 While some polls indicate the general public is willing to institute drug enforcement procedures which will infringe civil liberties, 110 the trend has been toward more lenient enforcement, at least for casual users -the group most likely to be exempted from forfeiture by the substantial connection test. Congress recently has enacted provisions which substantially decrease penalties for first-time offenders. 111 The new law reduces the maximum fine from $100,000 to $10,000 and shifts enforcement to the civil arena. 112 These changes were intentionally made by Congress; the Attorney General's office had not proposed the decrease in penalties. 113 In sum, while the text of section 881 may support a broad interpretation, a narrower scope for civil forfeiture better matches the intent of the enacting Congress, the understanding of subsequent Congresses, and present public opinion for fighting the war on drugs. As the next Part demonstrates, the eighth amendment may also mandate a narrower interpretation of section 881. 114 First, the forfeiture of conveyances or real property, especially those acquired legitimately and subject to forfeiture only by involvement in drug activity, should be treated as a criminal or quasi-criminal penalty. Despite express congressional intent to fashion a civil remedy, forfeiture's punitive nature mandates eighth amendment protection. Second, the lack of specific reference to criminal proceedings in the text of the eighth amendment strongly argues in favor of applying it to civil proceedings. While the Supreme Court has explicitly ruled out eighth amendment review of punitive damages awards in suits between private parties, 115 civil forfeiture. The cruel and unusual punishments clause or the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment or both ought to limit all section 881 forfeitures.
A. The Penal Nature of Forfeiture Mandates Eighth Amendment Review
This section advocates eighth amendment proportionality review of section 881 forfeitures. Civil forfeiture proceedings sufficiently penalize defendants that constitutional protections should be applied. Additionally, the Supreme Court's doctrine surrounding the cruel and unusual punishments clause and the excessive fines clause mandates eighth amendment review of civil forfeitures.
The initial question is whether constitutional protections should be applied in a civil forfeiture proceeding at all. Courts generally conclude that constitutional rights do not apply civil settings. 11 6 Government prosecution of civil forfeitures, however, requires constitutional protection. In several instances, the Supreme Court has applied certain constitutional protections to forfeiture proceedings, evincing concern for their quasi-criminal nature. In Boyd v. United States, 117 the Supreme Court applied the fifth amendment to a forfeiture proceeding, invalidating a statute compelling the defendant to produce documents of illegal importation or stand to have admitted the fact. While the "Court has declined ... to give full scope to the reasoning and dicta in Boyd ... ," 118 the proposition that forfeiture is at least quasi-criminal119 has survived. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 120 the Court followed Boyd and applied the exclusionary rule to evidence procured by an illegal search and offered in a civil forfeiture action. 121 The The Supreme Court has developed a two prong test to determine whether constitutional protections should be applied to a given statutory penalty:
First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention. 12 7
Analyzing section 881 under the first prong of this test will demonstrate that Congress intended the forfeiture to be a civil proceeding. The second prong, however, reveals that constitutional protections should apply. Civil forfeiture is a penal sanction and the risk of government police abuse justifies applying eighth amendment protections.
Congress undeniably intended section 881 to function as civil forfeiture. The legislative history establishes that the proceeding should be by way of libel in rem, a civil complaint against the property as wrongdoer. 128 Subsequent legislative pronouncements demonstrate that section 881 is considered a civil remedy. 129 Still, Congress did recognize the penal nature of forfeiture. The avowed purpose in depriving drug traffickers of assets and instrumentalities demonstrates Congress' intent to punish or at least incapacitate. 13 Cir. 1990 ) ("We are satisfied that the language of the subchapter shows that Con· gress intended § 881(a)(7) to be a civil remedy. We say this because § 88l(a) (7) seven factors to consider when determining whether a purportedly civil statute is sufficiently punitive to demand-application of the full panoply of constitutional rights available in criminal proceedings:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment -retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry .... 1 3 2
In general, however, courts considering whether constitutional protections reach section 881 proceedings have not discussed the Mendoza-Martinez test. In United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 133 the Ninth Circuit, while acknowledging that criminal forfeiture and civil forfeiture were "functionally equivalent," 13 4 held that the historical development of the proceedings differed and Congress still chose to make a distinction. 135 This result ignores the purpose of the Mendoza-Martinez test, which is to determine the substance behind the form of a sanction. 136 In United States v. Santoro, 137 the Fourth Circuit also deferred to congressional designation of section 881 as civil forfeiture. The court noted that congressional intent could be upset on " 'the clearest proof' that the effects of this statute are so punitive that the forfeiture cannot be treated as civil." 138 The Santoro court, however, failed to apply the Mendoza-Martinez test to determine whether that "clear proof" was present. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, continues to apply the Mendoza-Martinez test.139
Examining the Mendoza-Martinez factors establishes that civil forfeiture is sufficiently penal to justify application of constitutional pro-132. 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). 133. 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988 ), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 364 (1989 242, 249 (1989) ("This list of considerations, while certainly neither exhaustive nor dispositive, has proved helpful in our own consideration of similar questions ...• "). In one recent forfeiture case, the Supreme Court reviewed the enumerated factors to determine whether constitutional protection should be applied. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365-66 (1984) . In other areas, the Court continues to use the Mendoza-Martinez test to characterize penalties as either civil or criminal. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 , 1902 . [Vol. 89:165 tections. 140 Forfeiture clearly acts as an affirmative disability or liability, the first Mendoza-Martinez factor. Congress passed section 881 as a means of attacking the large scale drug trafficker, and of deterring the commission of drug felonies by eliminating the traffickers' profits. 141 More tellingly, Congress also intended to confiscate the instrumentalities of drug traffickers, thereby disabling them from future dealings. 142 Courts have recognized that forfeiture constitutes a punishment of the individual. In Boyd, the Supreme Court wrote, "We are also clearly of [the] opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal." 143 In In re Kingsley, 144 the First Circuit noted that application of the forfeiture laws could result in confiscation of all of the defendant's property. 145 The forfeiture of a person's assets certainly imposes an affirmative disability; the question must be whether that disability can be explained in civil terms. The forfeiture of conveyances under section 881(a)(4) and real property under 88l(a)(7), however, does not simply confiscate illegal property nor does it impose traditional civil damages. Plainly, the Puerto Rican forfeiture statutes further the punitive and deterrent purposes that have been found sufficient to uphold, against constitutional challenge, the application of other forfeiture statutes to the property of innocents. Forfeiture of conveyances that have been used -and may be used again -in violation of the narcotics laws fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes, both by preventing further illicit use of the conveyance and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable. 152 Despite congressional intent to develop a separate line of civil forfeiture statutes, distinct from criminal forfeiture, the substance of the history shows they are, in fact, the same. 15 3
The third Mendoza-Martinez factor, the finding of scienter, shows section 881 forfeiture as penal. This test factors out statutorily imposed penalties for negligence in the tort context. While the claimant need not be found guilty in a criminal trial for the property to be forfeit, 154 section 881 focuses on property used or "intended to be used" to facilitate drug crimes. 155 Several courts have held that involvement in drug trafficking is secondary; "intent is the determining factor •••• " 156 The statute creates an exception for innocent owners. 157 The Court in Calero-Toledo noted that forfeiture of innocent owners' property might give rise to constitutional problems.
[I]t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without causing a death, and is therefore forfeit. Traditionally, the king was to dedicate the property to charity. 151. 416 U.S. at 683-86; see also Note, supra note 17, at 172-75 (tracing the history of civil forfeiture); Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra note 44, at 28-29 (same).
152. 416 U.S. at 686-87 (footnote omitted). In the omitted footnote, the Court recognized that the Puerto Rican statute at issue was substantially the same as section 88l(a). 416 U.S. at 686 n.25.
153. This conclusion may be bolstered in three ways: (1) history should not be the touchstone and is, in fact, only one part of the Mendoza-Martinez analysis; (2) as section 11.B will argue, the eighth amendment was intended by the framers to apply to civil realm; (3) the conclusion of the Calero-Toledo court demonstrates that civil forfeiture serves the traditional aims of criminal law -punishment and deterrence.
154. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683. 155. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(4), (6), (7) Cir. 1989 ) ("It is the state of mind of the criminal with respect to the property sought to be forfeited which is determinative, not whether the property is actually used to execute the criminal intentions .••. ") (citing United States v. 124 East North Avenue, Lake Forest, Ill., 651 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Ill. 1987 ).
157. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(4)(b), (a)(7) (1988). Property will not be forfeit where used without the owner's permission or with permission but without consent to use in a drug transaction, provided the innocent owner has taken reasonable steps to prevent such use. 21 U.S.C. § § 88l(a)(4)(C), 88l(a)(7) (1988). See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 17 (arguing that innocent owners need added protections); Note, supra note 17 (same as to innocent transferees).
[Vol. 89:165 his privity or consent. Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive. 158 Further, while the forfeiture action is not predicated on violation of criminal statutes, the subsections triggering forfeiture, 881(a)(l)-(2), mirror criminal drug activity. 15 9 Applying the fourth Mendoza-Martinez factor, whether the penalty operates as punishment or deterrence, reveals that section 881 goes beyond other civil statutes. Whereas general civil remedies are directly proportional to the harm caused by the activity, civil forfeiture clearly serves to punish. " [A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can be explained only as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment .... " 1 60 In United States v. Ward, 161 the Supreme Court distinguished the holding of Boyd v. United States, 162 on the basis that the penalty imposed in Ward was "much more analogous to traditional civil damages." 163 In Ward, the statute imposed a fine on companies spilling oil in navigable waterways. The amount of the fine depended, in large part, on the actual cost of cleanup. 164 A civil penalty also qualifies as purely remedial if the government simply seizes contraband.165 The claimant cannot assert any property right in illegal goods. The Supreme Court has applied this distinction to a statute forfeiting automobiles used to further violation of state liquor tax laws. "There is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile. It is only the alleged use to which this particular automobile was put that subjects [its owner to possible forfeiture]." 166 Section 881 does not provide that forfeiture in an individual case will be ordered only where necessary to compensate the government. In practice, the application of section 881 operates to forfeit property based on its facilitation of or participation in drug crimes, not its relation to harm caused. 167 Congress added the real property forfeiture provision to 693, 699 (1965) . 167. While it might be contended that any property that facilitates drug crimes in any way causes immeasurable harm, the eighth amendment proportionality principle seems to demand determining precise costs. See infra notes 256-64 and accompanying text. Further, the premise of infinitely great harm seems implausible. section 881 to further the "deterrent" power of the law.1 68 In fact, even the Justice Department acknowledges that the "purpose of civil forfeiture is ... to deter and punish criminal activity. "1 6 9
The scope of property subject to forfeiture under section 88l{a)(4) is determined by sections 88l{a)(l), 88l(a)(2), and 88l{a)(9)1 7 0 which refer to the criminal drug statutes enacted as the "Controlled Substances Act." 171 This interconnection shows that the fifth MendozaMartinez factor, the criminal nature of the behavior, points toward applying constitutional protections. Under section 88l{a)(7), real property may be forfeit only if it facilitates the commission of a drug crime punishable by more than one year's imprisonment. 172 The main thrust of the civil forfeiture statutes is to attack or punish criminal behavior, not merely to act as a civil penalty for tortious conduct. In addition, section 881 incorporates administrative procedures for remission and mitigation. 173 The inclusion of these provisions indicates that only those suspected of criminal behavior will be prosecuted in a civil forfeiture action.114 170. These sections provide: • (a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this subchapter.
(9) All listed chemicals, all drug manufacturing equipment, all tableting machines, all encapsulating machines, and all gelatin capsules, which have been imported, exported, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or intended to be distributed, imported, or exported, in violation of a felony provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(l)-(2), (9) (1988). 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1988) provides for forfeiture, in most instances, of all conveyances used to facilitate transportation, etc., of the substances, materials, products, and equipment defined in sections (a)(l)- (2) § 1618 (1988) ; 28 C.F. R § 9 (1989) . 174. The regulation provides that the Attorney General will mitigate forfeiture or remit the property when a claimant can prove she had no knowledge of the illegal use of the property. 28 C.F. R § 9.5 (1989) The sixth Mendoza-Martinez factor seeks a rational alternative purpose for the penalty. While section 881 might be construed as a remedial compensation for the government's costs of preventing drug trafficking, this alternative purpose alone does not show section 881 to be nonpunitive. All criminal activity imposes social costs. A civil remedy exists only when the costs of the single act can be associated with a specific harm. 175 Section 881 does permit the proceeds of the forfeiture to fund further drug enforcement efforts. 176 This purpose, however, should be considered secondary. The costs of past and future drug enforcement cannot be traced to the particular activity giving rise to forfeiture. Additionally, the fines imposed in any criminal case could serve as repayment for enforcement expenses. 177 Absent the involvement of the property in criminal activity, the government's need for revenue would never justify forfeiture.178
The final Mendoza-Martinez factor, whether the penalty is excessive compared with any alternate purpose, militates in favor of applying constitutional protections to civil forfeiture. Section 881 does not require a determination that the value of the property sought to be forfeit is related to the harm caused or the cost of enforcement. Rather, the only determination required is whether the property somehow facilitated a drug crime. The potential for prosecutorial abuse is obvious. 179 In fact, since the enactment of provisions allowing prosecuting agencies to retain the forfeit property or its proceeds, the total dollar amount of forfeiture has jwnped dramatically. 180 While some increase may be due to heightened emphasis on drug crimes, the size of the jump strongly suggests an alternate motive, pecuniary gain for their departments, on the part of the police.181 manifest that they are intended to impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise. 401 U.S. at 721-22 (citations and footnote omitted). Each of the seven Martinez-Mendoza factors indicates section 881's civil forfeiture provisions should be considered punitive and actions thereunder should be conducted with constitutional safeguards. The "clearest proof" sought by the Santoro court18 2 seems to be present. Civil forfeiture ought to be considered a quasi-criminal proceeding and traditional constitutional protections ought to be applied.
See
B. The Eighth Amendment Should Apply to All Government Extracted Fines
Alternatively, eighth amendment protections should apply without regard to whether the proceeding is criminal/penal or civil. The Court's eighth amendment cases demonstrate concern for proportional punishment and protection against abuse of police powers. Section 881 forfeiture of property gives rise to these concerns, mandating explicit eighth amendment review.
Most of the Supreme Court's eighth amendment doctrine centers on the cruel and unusual punishments clause. This clause requires that all punishments be proportional to the behavior being punished. Section 881 runs afoul of the cruel and unusual punishment clause by utilizing forfeiture in all cases, regardless of the degree of involvement of the property or the seriousness of the crime.
The Supreme Court's eighth amendment proportionality doctrine focuses on the nature of both the crime and the punishment. In Rummel v. Estelle, 183 a case seen as an attempt to limit the applicability of eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis to death penalty cases, 184 the Court suggested that the triviality of the crime was a relevant factor. Rummel received a mandatory life sentence after obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses. 185 Rummel was convicted and sentenced under Texas' recidivist statutes. 186 The Court, in affirming Rummel's sentence, noted the "unique nature" of capital punto increase their own arsenals," is vigorously sought by police agencies.); id. (" 'The aim used tobe [sic] to hurt the bad guy' said Lisa Griffis, who manages seized and forfeited property for the United States Marshall Service in the southern district of Texas. 'Now we want to hurt the bad guy and maximize profit for the government.' "); id. ("The increased seizure activity nationwide is credited mostly to the provisions of the new law that allows asset sharing [,] " with local law enforcement agencies who may receive a portion of the proceeds from seized and sold property.). v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 , 1543 -44 (4th Cir. 1989 Like the respondent in this case, Rummel argued that the length of his imprisonment was so "grossly disproportionate" to the crime for which he was sentenced that it violated the ban on cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In rejecting that argument, we distinguished between punishments -such as the death penalty -which by their very nature differ from all other forms of conventionally accepted punishment, and punishments which differ from others only in duration. 200 provides additional justification for applying eighth amendment protections to civil forfeitures. In Browning-Ferris Industries, the Supreme Court considered whether the eighth amendment limits punitive damages in civil suits between private parties. The rationale the court provided for denying eighth amendment scrutiny in the case of punitive damages suggests the amendment should apply to civil forfeiture. 201 The eighth amendment's history demonstrates that i~ should be applied whenever the coercive power of the state is brought to bear. In Browning-Ferris Industries, the majority reviewed the history of the eighth amendment. The amercements clause of Magna Charta, 202 in language substantially similar to the eighth amendment, was addressed to the problem of wrongdoers being put at the "Mercy of the .King" when "it was within the King's power to require [the wrong- and beneficial physical relations to a given physical thing: he may physically control and use such thing, and he may physically exclude others from any similar control or enjoyment. But, obviously, such purely physical relations could as well exist quite apart from, or occasionally in spite of, the law of organized society: physical relations are wholly distinct from jural relations. The latter take significance from the law; and, since the purpose of the law is to regulate the conduct of human beings, all jural relations must, in order to be clear and direct in their meaning, be predicated of such human beings. 205 In Browning-Ferris Industries, Justice O'Connor, concurring in part, dissenting in part, noted that the framers' debates over the eighth amendment arguably point toward its application in civil as well as criminal contexts. "After deciding to confine the benefits of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to criminal proceedings, the Framers turned their attention to th~ Eighth Amendment. There were no proposals to limit that Amendment to criminal proceedings .... " 206 While implicitly rejecting the full force of the historical analysis above, 207 the Court's opinion in Browning-Ferris Industries does provide support for applying the excessive fines clause to civil proceedings in which the government prosecutes the action, including section 881 forfeitures. First, the Court interpreted fines broadly enough to include forfeitures.
United States
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning
In the absence of direct evidence of Congress' intended meaning, we think it significant that at the time of the drafting and ratification of the Amendment, the word "fine" was understood to mean a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense. Then, as now, fines were assessed in criminal, rather than in private civil, actions.2os ularly declared that excessive fines ought not to be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted •.
• ; and the same statute further declares, that all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons, before conviction, are illegal and void."); Massey, supra note 203, at 1255-56 ("Since ancient prohibitions against excessive amercements -the precursor to seventeenth-century fines -applied to both civil and criminal proceedings, and since similar prohibitions against excessive fines were ingrained in the case law, it was important for accuracy's sake that article ten [of the English Bill of Rights] not be limited to criminal cases.") (footnote omitted); id. at 1256 ("The Declaration of Rights' excessive fines clause thus should be read as simultaneously prohibiting excessive fines and amercements, whether imposed by judge or jury, in both civil and criminal proceedings.''). Professor Massey notes that forfeiture was one of the abuses the English Bill of Rights was intended to address. Id. at 1244 n. 62. 205. See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839, 842 (1962) (suggesting that by the time the eighth amendment was inserted into the Bill of Rights, the language had become constitutional "boilerplate"); Massey, supra note 203, at 1241-42 (same).
206. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909 Ct. , 2930 Ct. (1989 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Massey, supra note 203, at 1241
(noting the same history, but warning that "[f]ar too much meaning can be read into the congressional silence; a more likely, and mundane, reading is that Congress uncritically accepted the language, treating it as a shorthand expression for ancient rights rooted in the soil of English law"). Compare United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land Located in Warren Township, Bradford County, Pa., 898 F.2d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 1990) , where the court assumed that eighth amendment protections would only apply to criminal statutes, and predicated the application of that amendment on passing the two-part inquiry demanded in Ward (see supra note 127 and accompanying text): "When a statute is challenged under the eighth amendment on the ground that it is criminal rather than civil, a court will engage in a two-level inquiry. First, it will determine the congressional purpose. Second, if the statute is civil, the court will decide whether the statu· tory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate a civil objective."
The court failed to undertake the inquiry, however. See supra note 138. 207. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text (The history of the eighth amendment demonstrates that it should be applied in both civil and criminal contexts.). 208. 109 S. Ct at 2915 (footnote omitted).
Of course, the Court here distinguishes between criminal and civil actions. This would seem to make applicability of the excessive fines clause to civil forfeiture contingent upon passing the Mendoza-Martinez test. 209 This objection is premature. In a footnote in BrowningFerris Industries, the Court noted that "fines" could include "money, recovered in a civil suit, which was paid to government." 210 In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly distinguished a private civil suit on the grounds that, between two private parties, no concern of abuse of government power arose. "Simply put, the primary focus of the Eighth Amendment was the potential for governmental abuse of its 'prosecutorial' power, not concern with the extent or purposes of civil damages." 211 The Court continued, "These concerns are clearly inapposite in a case where a private party receives exemplary damages from another party, and the government has no share in the recovery."212 The Court cited for comparison United States v. Halper,2 13 which applied the double jeopardy clause to government imposition of civil fines. In Halper, the government's police power was implicated in a manner analogous to forfeiture. Second, in a civil forfeiture proceeding, the potential for government abuse is unambiguous. · The government is entitled to seize the suspect property before the proceeding. 214 The government brings the action against the property and the claimant, need only prove probable cause, and may do so by the introduction of circumstantial or hearsay evidence. 215 By a combination of the section 881 provisions, all of a person's property and assets can be confiscated; in such a situation, judicial review of the remedy should be strict, not perfunctory.216
Through either of two avenues, section 881 forfeiture should be subject to eighth amendment review. A forfeiture proceeding does not focus on the traditional elements of a civil claim for damages; rather section 881 acts to punish and deter persons involved in drug traffick- Cir. 1989 ) (asserting "well settled" principle that hearsay and circumstantial evidence are admissible to prove probable cause).
216. See cases cited supra note 13 (potential for abuse). In Browning-Ferris Industries, the Court noted that a jury in civil cases can check any excessive statutory remedy. 109 S. Ct. at 2919. While "a claimant who has had property seized pursuant to section 881 is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of whether the property was connected with drugs~]" Darmstadter & Vol. 89:165 ing. Alternatively, eighth amendment protections should apply to all government imposed fines and penalties.
III. Two APPROACHES TO NARROWING THE SCOPE OF
FORFEITURE
This Part applies the substantial connection test and eighth amendment proportionality review as two methods for narrowing the scope of section 881 forfeiture. 217 The first section examines and attempts to harmonize the cases decided under the substantial connection test. The substantial connection cases generally deny forfeiture when the property has only facilitated the underlying criminal activity in a removed, incidental manner. This note suggests reformulating the substantial connection test into a second degree facilitation test. Next, this Part identifies the seeds of eighth amendment review in the substantial connection cases, and argues that the second degree facilitation test for rationalizing the substantial connection cases meets eighth amendment standards. This Part contends that the substantial connection test does not go far enough; eighth amendment proportionality review ought to be a factor in all forfeitures under section 881. Finally, this Part suggests that applying the substantial connection test, eighth amendment review, or both, need not impede the war on largescale drug trafficking.
A. Harmonizing the Substantial Connection Cases
Many courts applying section 881 have employed the substantial connection or nexus analysis. In general, these courts have upheld forfeiture even under the stricter standard of review. The connection between the conveyance of real property and the underlying criminal activity in any particular case will fall along a spectrum. 218 This section attempts to formulate a workable standard for determining instances where forfeiture should not be allowed. To that end, this section analyzes five cases in which the courts refused to order forfeiture and which fall along the hypothetical connectedness spectrum. This section concludes that a test for second degree facilitation identifies cases where forfeiture should not be ordered.
217. While the two paths have been developed somewhat independently in this Note, some connections are obvious. For example, the general eighth amendment arguments, especially in light of the rules of construction discussed in section I.B, support the substantial connection test (or another narrow construction of § 881). Additionally, the substantial connection test indicates that some courts find forfeiture to be a disproportionate penalty in certain cases; this general perception should be extended to include general eighth amendment review in all forfeiture cases.
218. Even the Justice Department admits that some property will not be forfeitable under any standard of review. See 11 THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL B-25 (Prentice Hall Law & Business Supp. 1988-2) ("Whatever judicial standard is applied, it is clear that the more remote the connection between the conveyance and the illegal activity, the less likely it is that the property is subject to forfeiture."). ·
The first two cases denying forfeiture can be disposed of on grounds which need not rely on the substantial connection test. In these cases, the government simply failed to prove any connection. In United States v. One 1981 Cadillac Eldorado, 219 the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) had been investigating the claimant's husband and daughter for alleged involvement in heroin trafficking. The DEA agents one evening followed the reputed traffickers and attempted to pull them over. The suspects sped away in their automobile and were apprehended only after a high speed chase. The car and the suspects were searched but the DEA agents found no drugs and the suspects were released. The next day the DEA agent found two packets of heroin in his official car, in which the suspects had been transported to the police station. The government attempted to prove by circumstantial evidence that the heroin packets could have come only from the suspects and, therefore, the defendant automobile must have been used in the transportation of drugs. 220 The court found that the inferences urged by the government were insufficient to sustain forfeiture. 221 Despite the court's language, this decision was not based on a true substantial connection analysis. The substantial connection test admits the connection of the property with a crime, but denies forfeiture on the basis that the connection is too attenuated. Here, the court refused to find that any crime had been established.
In United States v. One 55 Foot Fishing Vessel ... Known as "The Sole, " 222 a court also used the rhetoric of substantial connection, but the decision actually denied any connection. In this case, an informant contacted a DEA agent and stated he had unloaded marijuana bales from a mother ship to a fishing vessel. After extensive searching by the DEA, the informant identified the defendant vessel through a photograph. The trial court, in its decision on the merits, noted that it had issued a warrant of seizure based on this information. "More than mere suspicion was involved that there was a nexus between this property and the crime. The information supplied by the informant was adequate and sufficiently reliable . . . . " 223 After trial on the merits, 219. 535 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill. 1982) . 220. The evidence consisted of testimony by the DEA agent to whom the official car was assigned that no one but himself, his partner, and the two suspects had been in the car for the prior two days. 535 F. Supp. at 67.
221. 535 F. Supp. at 68. The court wrote:
The connection that the government has been able to show in the case at bar, while not wholly unreasonable, is not sufficient to pass the threshold of probable cause that the vehicle in question was involved in the transport of narcotics as a matter oflaw. For this Court to permit forfeiture of claimant's vehicle under these tenuous fact circumstances would sanction a precedent -subject to potential abuse -for the disposition of other forfeiture cases. 535 F. Supp. at 68. 222. 656 F. Supp. 967 (D. Mass. 1987). 223. 656 F. Supp. at 969. [Vol. 89:165 however, the court found that the fishing vessel in question was more likely a similar vessel owned by the claimant's brother. 224 Hence, this forfeiture denial was also based on the grounds no connection existed. The second group of cases truly followed the substantial connection test. These cases refused forfeiture when the involvement of the conveyance was, in some way, removed from the criminal activity. In United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 225 the claimant drove the defendant automobile to Logan Airport to deliver the front money for an LSD purchase. The claimant was arrested at the airport and the automobile was seized. The First Circuit reversed the lower court's forfeiture order, reasoning that section 881 provided per se forfeiture only for the transportation of drugs. The First Circuit simply did not believe Congress intended a tenuous connection such as the one in this case to support forfeiture. 226 The court viewed facilitation as significantly different from the "used in" language of the statute. "Although we agree that DeLorenzo's promise to reimburse Simard may have been essential to the occurrence of the transaction, once the sale had been consummated, Simard's actual reimbursement was not necessary to 'facilitate' that transaction. " 227 The court seems to be suggesting that only those uses which make easier the actual consummation of the illegal activity will support forfeiture. Under this standard, a car used as a place to conduct a sale out of plain view would be forfeitable, while a car which solely transports the seller away from the scene of the sale 228 would not.
This interpretation of One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, that facilitation must involve an "antecedent relationship" to the criminal transaction, is inadequate. While the automobile may not have facilitated the sale of the drugs, the automobile did facilitate both the transportation and possession of the drugs after the sale; facilitation of transportation or possession are bases for forfeiture under section 881. 229 The "antecedent relationship" test also would disallow the forfeiture of vehicles whose use constitutes a but-for cause of the crime. The court admitted that the claimant's commitment to provide financing was essential to the deal. It is possible, however, to view the court's decision as drawing a line at two-step relationships to the drug crime. The court obviously would agree that financing facilitates a drug transaction. Similarly, a car actually moving the drugs would facilitate a crime and would be forfeit. 230 A car used as transportation by the financier, 224. The brother admitted as much in testimony before the court. 656 F. Supp. at 970. 225. 625 F.2d 1026 (1st Cir. 1980 however, merely facilitates the financing of the crime or, in other words, "facilitates the facilitation." The First Circuit could logically claim that this second degree facilitation did not fall within the scope of the statute, notwithstanding the "in any manner" language.
The second true substantial connection case, United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-up, 231 can be read consistently with the second degree facilitation test. In this case, the claimant was observed driving the defendant truck near marijuana fields. The claimant parked nearby and unloaded roofing supplies for a small shed near the fields. The claimant then surveyed the marijuana crop. The Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court's forfeiture order on the grounds that no evidence demonstrated that the truck had facilitated growing the crop.
While this use of the truck may be said to have facilitated the repair of the shed, we do not believe this fact suffices to show that the truck facilitated the possession of the marijuana. It is unclear as to how the shed helped or otherwise made easier the possession of the crop. In fact, there was testimony that the shed was too small to be of any use in processing the crop or in shielding the drugs from detection once harvested.
Finally, there was no evidence presented that the truck was used to transport seed, fertilizer, agricultural tools or other equipment, items which could be said to have facilitated the cultivation of the illegal crop.232 While the tending of a marijuana crop would definitely constitute facilitation, the conveyance here was several steps removed from that involvement. In the absence of more direct evidence, a visit to tend the shed that may have been used in growing the marijuana was second degree facilitation. 233
The second degree facilitation test does not, however, fit all present cases denying forfeiture. For example, in United States v. Certain Lots In City of Virginia Beach, 234 a DEA agent contacted the claimant to arrange the sale of some cocaine to acquaintances of the agent. At the agent's insistence, the claimant allowed the agent to come to the claimant's residence to finalize the transaction and view the cocaine. The agent and the claimant then left for the site of the actual sale. On the way, the claimant was arrested.
In rejecting forfeiture of the real property, the court relied on several rationales. First, the court emphasized that the property had been used for only one transaction. 235 This argument is inconsistent with 231. 769 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1985 Second, the court relied on the fact that the DEA agent had insisted on meeting in the claimant's house. 237 The court may have been concerned that these actions resembled entrapment. If read this way, the court's decision holds that the government should not be able to manipulate the transaction to involve additional property that, in the absence of other crimfo.al involvement, would not be forfeit. In other words, the Certain Lots court did not attempt to identify a place on the spectrum of connection segregating justified and unjustified forfeitures. Rather, the case noted the absence of any evidence that the real property facilitated other drug activities, and excluded the evidence from the single event which occurred at the insistence of the DEA agent.
The second degree facilitation test serves as an effective surrogate for the substantial connection test. In addition to rationalizing some of the leading cases, the test provides a construct courts may be able to apply more consistently. The second degree facilitation test looks to the quality of the connection instead of attempting to place an individual case on the entire spectrum.
B. Finding the Seeds of Eighth Amendment Analysis in the Substantial Connection Test
Eighth amendment proportionality review evinces concern for the harshness of the penalty and the seriousness of the crime. 238 This section establishes that these same concerns inform the substantial connection cases and suggests that courts following the substantial connection test should consider applying full proportionality review.
In United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 239 the court applied the substantial connection test on the basis of the relatively mi-236. See, e.g., United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989 The argument that forfeiture should only be applied upon a showing of multiple crimes is not supported by the text of § 881. The statute calls for forfeiture after the commission of any felony. Additionally, to make § 881 contingent on a pattern of behavior would be to make its forfeiture provisions redundant with the forfeiture provisions governing continuing criminal enterprises, 21 u.s.c. § § 848-853 (1988 247. This review is no more invasive than the Supreme Court's offered analysis in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980) . Although Rummel identified the death penalty as a unique type of punishment, inquiry into whether it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment requires an analysis of the particular case and a determination whether the death penalty is out of proportion to the type of crime. Rummel 445 U.S. at 271-72.
248. The line is, of course, subject to close cases and somewhat varying interpretations. This objection should not, however, destroy its utility as a starting point. See Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 380 (1985) . , A line that is determined "arbitrarily" rather than by tracking some natural division of the world need not be any less precise than any other kind of line, and is often more precise. There is then no reason to suppose that the line, once drawn, cannot bear the burden of preventing a decisionmaking body from going further.
[Vol. 89:165 Courts would not be· called upon to evaluate the seriousness of any single drug crime or the degree of involvement of the property and whether forfeiture was a proportional punishment. Rather, after determining whether the property facilitated the crime directly or only by means of a secondary mechanism, the court would either permit or deny forfeiture. This would foster consistency in judicial decision making. 249 Additionally, the penalty imposed on those participating in large scale drug trafficking would not be impaired. Rather, those persons whose involvement was minor or questionable would receive rough justice. The security of interest in legitimately acquired property would be preserved.
C. Applying the Eighth Amendment to Section 881 Forfeitures
Section 881 forfeitures should receive full proportionality review. Application of the court's current cruel and unusual punishments clause doctrine will demonstrate that some section 881 forfeitures should be denied or judicially mitigated. Additionally, the excessive fines clause provides grounds for true proportionality review of forfeitures. Objections to judicial review based on practicality or on deference to the legislature fail to recognize situations where the judiciary engages in analogous forms of balancing. This balancing, mandated by respect for constitutional rights, protects claimants in civil forfeiture actions while maintaining the efficacy of forfeiture as a weapon against drug traffickers.
The cruel and unusual punishments clause "prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed." 250 In Solem v. Helm, 2 51 the Supreme Court addressed the question whether its previous opinion in Rummel v. Estelle252 limited cruel and unusual punishment review to capital cases and explicitly held that it did not. 253 While the Court noted that successful eighth amendment challenges outside the capital context would Id. This line, however, does attempt to track the natural world. Additionally, the second degree facilitation test provides an additional method for analyzing forfeiture cases. It usefully shifts the debate from whether the connection was substantial "enough," a question fraught with policy implications, to whether the involvement was one or more steps removed from the activities identified in the forfeiture statute.
249. This is not to foreclose the possibility that eighth amendment analysis should always be concerned with proportionality. The next section advocates this approach. Here, I have focused on the quality distinction as one way to meet the primary objection of judicial second guessing and to appeal to a wider body of Supreme Court decisions. Still, after Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) Cir. 1989 ),petitionforcert.filed (U.S. Jan. 29, 1990 . ("Petitioner Young was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 650 grams or more of heroin. We have little doubt that her crime is one of the gravest a person can commit today."); Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane) ("Except in rare cases, the murderer's red hand falls on one victim only, however grim the blow; but the foul hand of the drug dealer blights life after life and, like the vampire of fable, creates others in its owner's evil imageothers who create others still, across our land and down our generations, sparing not even the unborn.") (quoting Terrebone v. Butler, 820 F.2d 156, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1987) ).
262. The use of drugs may have collateral consequences such as robbery. However, this collateral activity is independently criminalized and is not of the nature of addiction. By contrast, drug trafficking, by its very nature, encourages widespread addiction. In any event, the collateral effects of trafficking certainly have a much wider ambit. [Vol. 89:165 guish based on the claimant's position in the distribution chain. Sections 88l(a)(l) and (2), 263 the sections triggering forfeiture, focus solely on connection with illegal drugs. The courts presently have not adopted a de rninirnis exception for users. 264 The differing gravity of the consequences suggest that courts should look to the individual circumstances before ordering forfeiture.
The second prong of the Solem analysis requires a comparison of penalties for other crimes in federal drug law. With the exception of 49 U.S.C. section 781, section 881 forfeiture applies to far less severe criminal activity than other forfeiture statutes. 265 Outside section 881, forfeiture may be imposed for a drug crime either by criminal forfeiture266 or by forfeiture of a continuing criminal enterprise. 26 7 In both circumstances, the scope of the potential punishment is much narrower. Criminal forfeiture may be granted only when the defendant has been found guilty of an offense "punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." 268 Narcotics offenses carrying prison terms of more than one year include: manufacturing or distributing, 269 distributing drugs without a prescription or forging prescriptions, 270 manufacturing or distributing in or near schools, 271 and employment of persons under eighteen years of age for the purpose of avoiding the narcotics laws. 272 Specifically excluded from punishment by imprisonment for greater than one year is simple possession. 273 Proof of a continuing criminal enterprise likewise requires showing substantial criminal activity. 274 These statutes recognize that forfeiture is a serious penalty to be applied only to significant criminal activities, and do not require forfeiture for crimes punishable by less than one year in prison. Since individual users cannot be punished for longer than one year, 275 these statutes explicitly track the distinction previously made, between drug traffickers and users. Further, these statutes at least implicitly recognize a per se exemption for the casual user.
The third Solem factor requires comparison of section 881 to state forfeiture statutes. While several state forfeiture statutes substantially follow section 881, 276 these statutes are narrower than section 881 in some significant ways. For example, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has held the presumption of forfeitability applied to money found on a drug trafficker is rebutted when the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal proceeding. 277 While this does not limit directly the scope of the property forfeitable, this presumption does accord additional procedural protection to the claimant. 278 Both Kentucky and South Dakota exempt from forfeiture property used to facilitate crimes involving personal use amounts of marijuana. 27 9 The standard for utilizing this data is unclear. First, while the statutory language may be similar, the courts of many states have yet to address the scope of their statutes. 280 Section 881 itself preempts state law and requires forfeiture of the offending property to the United States, 281 thus depriving states of the opportunity to litigate the issue. Second, interpretation of state forfeiture statutes likely will follow the federal experience. 282 Third, it is unclear how much dissonance between the punishment applied in a given case and the practice in other jurisdictions must exist for an eighth amendment violation to be found. In Solem v. Helm, 283 the Supreme Court found that the questioned penalty, life without prospect of parole for a seventh nonviolent crime, was more severe than that which could be applied in any other state. 284 The Court overturned the sentence. In Young v. Miller, 285 on the other hand, the Sixth Circuit upheld a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a first time offender involved in the sale of 650 grams of heroin. The court there noted that the sentence imposed by Michigan was the harshest allowed in the nation, but was not so out of line with other states as to justify overruling it. 2 86
The best resolution of this indeterminate standard of review would be to adopt a case-by-case approach, giving greater weight to the comparable federal provisions. Forfeiture will not be excessive in all circumstances, especially in cases involving large scale drug trafficking. Because section 881 authorizes forfeiture in even the most minimal cases, the factors of individual cases should be weighed. In general, the three-part Solem analysis justifies careful consideration of forfeiture in individual use cases. The collateral effects of personal use are substantially smaller than trafficking. Federal forfeiture statutes in other areas and some state statutes modeled after section 881 seem to recognize the severity of forfeiture and restrict its use to serious crimes.
Case-by-case analysis of forfeitures would follow the requirements of the excessive fines clause. While the cruel and unusual punishment clause may seem, on its face, focused on specific types of punishments that can be identified in the abstract, the excessive fines clause seems to require considering each case individually. An absolute rule, that all fines over a certain dollar amount are excessive would make little sense. Rather, "excessive" depends upon the context of a certain case.281 281. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a), (h) (1988 In determining whether to impose a fine, and the amount, time for payment, and method of payment of a fine, the court shall consider, in addition to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)-
(1) the defendant's income, earning capacity, and financial resources; (2) the burden that the fine will impose upon the defendant, any person who is finan- [Vol. 89:165 described by Congress in setting bail. 293 These factors have been held to protect against the imposition of excessive fines. 2 94 RICO provides an example of how courts could review forfeitures to effectuate eighth amendment concerns. In RICO, courts routinely determine the extent of the property used to maintain the RICO enterprise. The difficult arena for section 881 forfeiture is the seizure of legitimately acquired property. In RICO, however, the seizure is limited to the tainted proceeds. 295 Because of this limitation, eighth amendment concerns are mitigated. The forfeiture consists only of the illegal proceeds from the RICO enterprise. The Second Circuit's analysis in United States v. Huber 2 9 6 typifies the strategy.
We do not say that no forfeiture sanction may ever be so harsh as to violate the Eighth Amendment. But at least where the provision .
•. is keyed to the magnitude of a defendant's criminal enterprise, as it is in RICO, the punishment is at least in some rough way proportional to the crime. We further note that where the forfeiture threatens disproportionately to reach untainted property of a defendant, for example, if the criminal and legitimate aspects of the "enterprise" have been commingled over time, section 1963 permits the district court a certain amount of discretion in avoiding draconian (and perhaps potentially unconstitutional) applications of the forfeiture provision. 2 9 7 This strategy is analogous to the distinction previously drawn, that assets derived from drug transactions under section 88l(a)(6) clearly are forfeitable. 298 Forfeitures proceeding under section 88l(a) (4) 295. See, e.g., United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352 , 1365 (2d Cir. 1989 ) ("The Congressional aim guiding these forfeitures is to recover all of the racketeer's ill-gotten gains but not to seize legitimately acquired property.").
296. 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979 ).
297. 603 F.2d at 397; see also United States v. Acosta, 881 F.2d 1039, 1041 n.4 (11th Cir.
1989) (RICO forfeiture does not violate the eighth amendment because, "in light of the extent of appellant's racketeering activities and his resulting profits, the forfeitures in the instant case serve merely to divest appellant of his ill-gotten wealth."); United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 663 (9th Cir. 1988 ) ("When the district court orders that the defendant forfeit the profits gained from illegal activity, it is hard to imagine how such a forfeiture could constitute cruel and unusual punishment."); United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1984 (a)(7), on the other hand, would be more carefully scrutinized as a fine since the defendant initially acquired the property legitimately. The RICO example also serves to refute the major criticism of extended judicial use of eighth amendment review. The main objection to employing the eighth amendment in this context, and indeed the main concern of the majority in Rummel v. Estelle, 299 is that the federal courts not evaluate the appropriateness of the length of a sentence. If the decision is whether to impose X or Y number of years of identical confinement or X or Y dollars fine, the legislature may indeed be the more competent or otherwise appropriate decisionmaker. 300 The Rummel court, however, argued that courts are competent to evaluate whether a certain type of punishment is excessive for the crime committed. In Solem, the dissenters, who numbered among the majority in Rummel, worried that the judiciary would substitute their own judgment for the sentences prescribed by the legislature. 3 01 Still, the judiciary must "ultimately decide the meaning of the Eighth Amendment." 302 The RICO example demonstrates that the judiciary is capable of focusing on the activity Congress wished to stop while protecting eighth amendment concerns.
Increased judicial diligence in monitoring the magnitude of forfeiture will not harm the war on drugs. 303 The assets which constitute illegally derived profits will be subject to forfeiture without question. Further, through the appropriate use of presumptions, few large scale traffickers will retain conveyances or real property when forfeiture is sought under sections 881(a)(4) or (a)(7). For example, courts could presume that the automobiles of a large scale drug trafficker without other visible means of support actually were bought with proceeds from illegal activities, despite the difficulty of directly proving that fact. 304 Finally, even if the conveyance or real property was legiti- [Vol. 89:165 mately purchased, the court still may find, after review of its proportionality or excessiveness, that the forfeiture constituted an acceptable fine for the defendant's criminal activity.
This Part has attempted to give some substance to the substantial connection test and to eighth amendment review of section 881 forfeiture. The substantial connection test should be refocused on how removed the conveyance or real property sought has been to the underlying drug activity. While a step in the right direction, even the "second degree facilitation" test does not fully protect claimants facing civil forfeiture. To that end, this section has demonstrated that eighth amendment review of section 881 forfeiture would, at a minimum, exempt many individual users and should be applied to protect the rights of all defendants.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note offers two justifications for narrowing the scope of civil forfeiture. Courts should adopt the substantial connection test as the best reading of section 881. Admittedly, the language of the section seems to support the broadest possible scope for forfeiture. This Note has contended, however, that Section 881, read against the full range of interpretive aids, commands forfeiture only where the property bears a substantial connection to the underlying criminal activity.
Courts should also treat each forfeiture as if it were a criminal fine and evaluate its proportionality. Civil forfeiture often extinguishes legitimately acquired property rights. These forfeitures are executed without regard to the magnitude of the crime, the value of the property or any characteristics of the individual defendant. This Note has argued therefore that section 881 operates as a criminal punishment. Further, when the government seeks forfeiture, eighth amendment protections against government punishment are implicated; each forfeiture should be subject to individual proportionality review. Civil forfeiture is a powerful weapon for eliminating the profit of drug trafficking. The very power of the weapon mandates guarding against abuse.
-James B. Speta Contained in Account Number 031-217362, 661 F. Supp. 697, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1986 ) (once the government proves some money in an account is tainted, the claimant bears the burden of proving any portion is not).
